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Abstract
Introducing the concept of innovation capital we will analyse conditions under which a national industry is able
to succeed in international Schumpeterian competition. Then we will discuss the significance of this concept
for the economic development of the German plastics industry from the 1930s to the 1970s. Using a repeated
game model of technological cooperation we will especially focus on technological transfers from chemical
firms to plastics fabricators. We will deploy both a microeconomic approach when viewing product
innovations transferred by the so-called Kunststoffrohstoffabteilung (KURO) of chemical firm BASF, and
a macroeconomic approach when looking at the development of total factor productivity in the German
plastics fabricating industry. It will turn out that we can distinguish three subperiods with respect to
technological cooperation in the German plastics industry: the beginning in the period of National Socialist
dictatorship and post war reconstruction, the developing in the time of the West German economic miracle,
and the ending in the decade of the two oil price shocks.
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Introduction

1.1

Innovation capital of national industries

Since the Second World War both per capita income and overall economic productivity of the nations joined
together in the OECD have converged. At the same time we can observe that each of these nations has
brought forth particular industries dominating international markets by their comparatively superior capability
to innovate. Besides general convergence international division of labor has been increasing (DOLLAR,
W OLFF , 1993). These findings seem to contradict the often used assumption that both technological and
economic knowledge are available in the form of “blueprints” and therefore easily imitable by foreign
competitors. The long-term predominance of national industries in international Schumpeterian competition
(SCHUMPETER, 1952, pp. 100-103) rather justifies the opposite conjecture that an important part of the
capability of an industry to innovate is deeply rooted in its national location and in the people working there.
Recent surveys (P ORTER, 1990, NELSON, 1993) explain the international Schumpeterian competitiveness of
national industries by the superiority of “national systems of innovation” thereby neglecting the fact that
international successful and hardly competitive industries coexist in highly developed economies. We claim
in this paper that the capability of a national industry to innovate is less based on national peculiarities than
on an industry-specific asset called “innovation capital.”1 Innovation capital means the part of the human
capital which enables a firm or industry both to develop inventions at the respective technological frontier and
to transform them in economically successful innovations (FREEMAN, SOETE, 1997, p. 202). Failed innovations
like the British-French supersonic passenger aircraft Concorde do show that technological know-how alone
is often not sufficient to make a new product an economic success. Innovators also need knowledge about
expected market demand, different sales channels, or alternative financing sources. To succeed in
Schumpeterian competition a national industry requires both technological and economic innovation capital.
To elaborate the meaning of these terms we will take a closer look at the innovation process of a firm in
which innovation capital serves as an input. The innovation process itself describes the risky attempt of a firm
at developing a new market good. It is divided in the planning phase, the R&D phase, and the marketing
phase. The planning phase in which the managers have to decide which R&D projects will be actually carried
out is characterized by great uncertainty. Because of the increasing diversification and the fast progress of
knowledge a firm cannot take the technological lead in every scientific field which may be important for its
future economic development. Instead of doing that it has to concentrate its research efforts on small regions
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TEECE and PISANO (1994) use the term “dynamic capabilities” in a similar meaning.
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of the technological frontier. The outcomes of these R&D projects are unknown ex ante. The probability of
failure is high and cannot be exactly quantified. This technological uncertainty will be reduced if the firm has
already finished some R&D projects at the same region of the technological frontier. In this case the
information obtained from the finished R&D projects builds up to technological innovation capital which can
be used to assess the current R&D projects.
However, technological innovation capital only helps to predict the technological outcome of R&D
projects. The managers have also to know if there is a potential market demand for the possible technological
inventions. This economic uncertainty can be reduced by forming links with government agencies and other
industries. To show when these links mean economic innovation capital it is worth to discuss the cases
“potential government’s demand” and “inter-industry networks” briefly.
Firms may invest some money in risky R&D projects to maintain their chances of finding inventions in new
technological fields. They will be willing to do this more likely, if there exists a potential consumer who
promises to buy a large amount of the new goods and what is more finances parts of firms’ R&D. In
economic history governments often played this role. IBM, for instance, underestimating future private
demand was only led to develop computers by military demand in the early 1950s (KATZ , P HILLIPS, 1982,
p. 177). Potential government’s demand often causes the development of new market goods because it
considerably reduces economic uncertainty in the planning phase of the innovation process. Governments
influencing the direction of firms’ R&D should nevertheless be very careful since they do not know the future
either. Misleading decisions are always possible.
Inter-industry networks are built up between upstream and downstream industries to exchange
information. Within inter-industry networks firms often reveal a good deal of their technological knowledge
and their production and sales plans. This information can also be used to harm revealing firms. This is why
mutual trust might be a necessary condition for working networks (LUNDVALL, 1988, p. 353). By learning
about actual problems and needs of downstream industries, upstream industries can tell which kind of
inventions will be successful innovations. Here the demand side determines the choice of the R&D projects
in the planning phase. It is also possible that an upstream industry develops both a new product and innovative
ways in which it can be used in downstream industries. In this case the supply side decides about the future
direction of the technological development. An industry without any own R&D efforts will profit from other
industries’ R&D through purchasing their innovations (WOLFF, 1996). Furthermore technological transfers
can be the result of communication, i.e. technological cooperation within networks. In both cases innovation
capital flows from industries with high R&D to industries with low R&D. This process can lead to clusters
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of national industries being highly competitive in international markets. We will see that upstream industries
can also use technological transfers as a means to bind downstream industries as long-term customers.
After deciding which R&D projects will be carried out the R&D phase of the innovation process begins
in which the R&D staff of the firm actually tries to discover a new invention. The probability of success of
this attempt will be increased by deploying already existing technological innovation capital. Technological
innovation capital is based on past experiences and often tacit. Tacit knowledge (P OLYANI, 1966) means here
that the employees do know how to solve technical and economic problems occurring on a special region of
the technological frontier but cannot explicitly communicate these skills. Tacit knowledge is firmly anchored
in people and in the way they work together in a particular organizational structure. That is why competitors
can hardly imitate this kind of specific knowledge in the short run. If the R&D phase has ended with the
development of an invention the marketing phase will start in which the firm tries to build up a market for its
new product. For this the economic innovation capital plays a crucial role again. The established links to other
industries or government agencies help to find new customers. However, economic innovation capital includes
not only links but also knowledge about innovative marketing strategies. We will deal with the latter in the
following in great detail.
No matter if the innovation process eventually results in a successful innovation or not firms will gain new
information which will add to the stock of already existing innovation capital. This growing innovation capital
may enable firms both to find innovations in the technological neighborhood of familiar products and to imitate
innovations of competitors fastly (NELSON, WINTER, 1982, p. 386). The chain of innovations within this limited
but progressing field of knowledge will be called technological path. National industries which enter an
established technological path later lack the innovation capital of the first-movers. This means a competitive
disadvantage which cannot easily be offset. While laggards are trying to catch up by gaining their own
specific knowledge first-movers themselves are building up additional technological innovation capital which
is used to develop further innovations beyond the technological and economic capabilities of the laggards.2
This explains why particular national industries can maintain their lead in Schumpeterian competition over a
long time.
In the following section we will briefly deal with the opening of the technological path of the German
plastics industry in the 1930s and the role which potential government’s demand played in this process. Then
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FUDENBERG et al (1983, pp. 5-9) show for patent races, i.e. for the formation of technological innovation
capital, that laggards who cannot hope to catch up drop own R&D projects.
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we will discuss technological cooperation and innovative marketing strategies with the main emphasis on the
German chemical firm BASF from the 1930s to the 1970s. A game theoretical model described in section 2
will lead the empirical analysis in section 3.

1.2

The innovation capital of the German plastics industry

The German plastics industry is a national cluster including machine makers specialized in plastics fabricating
machines, chemical firms producing plastic materials, and plastics fabricators. These three subindustries
impress due to their comparatively high shares in world exports in the period after the Second World War.
In 1970, for example, West Germany’s average share in world exports was 11.1 %. However, the respective
numbers for the makers of plastics fabricating machines, the plastic materials producers, and the plastics
fabricators were 31.7 %, 24.2 %, and 19.8 % (UNITED NATIONS, 1974). This result cannot be explained by
comparatively low prices of the German suppliers (FREEMAN, 1963). It rather verifies the exceptional
Schumpeterian competitiveness of the German plastics industry which itself was caused by its high innovation
capital primarily accumulated by chemical firms and then transferred to machine makers and plastics
fabricators.
The so-called “Ersatzstoffeuphorie” (substitute euphoria) in Germany in the first half of the twentieth
century is the historical background of German chemical firms’ early engagement on the technological path
of plastics. This “Ersatzstoffeuphorie” was triggered by production of synthetic fertilizers and explosives
during the First World War and culminated in striving for autarky in the Third Reich. Early basic innovations
were high pressure synthesis of ammonia by the chemical firm BASF in 1913 and industrial production of
acetylene on the basis of coal and lime invented by Farbenwerke Hoechst in 1917. The synthesis of ammonia
led to independence from Chilean saltpetre imports and was model for synthesis of methanol (1922) which
on its part enabled polycondensation of urea-formaldehyde resins. Acetylene also used to produce explosives
evolved to an important raw material of plastics production in the 1930s (P LUMPE, 1990), but it was the
search for methods of producing synthetic rubber which was the main impetus for opening up the
technological path of plastics in Germany.
During the First World War Germany was cut off from markets for natural rubber. In this period synthetic
rubber (methylrubber) was produced for the first time by Farbenwerke Hoechst in a total amount of 2350
tons. In 1926 I.G. Farben had taken up again the synthetic rubber research program and succeeded in
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developing a high quality all purpose rubber on the basis of butadiene and styrene, named BUNA S, in the
early 1930s. The technological innovation capital built up in the synthetic rubber research program also
enabled discoveries of basic product innovations in the technological neighborhood of BUNA S:
1.

Scientists of BASF discovered in 1930 that styrene used for BUNA S can also be polymerized to the
plastic material polystyrene.

2.

Furthermore polystyrene can be processed to the foamed material “STYROPOR.”This plastic good
invented by BASF in 1952 has found above all a use in construction industry.

3.

The method of emulsion polymerization also developed in the synthetic rubber research program was
used to produce the plastic material polyvinylchloride by BASF in 1931.

4.

Copolymerization of butadiene, styrene and acrylonitrile led to latexes which serve among other things
for the production of artificial leather.

5.

In 1940 I.G. Wolfen invented the synthetic fibre “DRALON” on basis of polyacrylonitrile.

6.

In the 1930s BUNA S induced the building up of production capacities for ethylene which is a raw
material for styrene. After the Second World War these capacities facilitated the fast imitation of
high pressure polyethylene, a plastic material developed by British ICI in 1937. What is more Hoechst
discovered a method to produce low pressure polyethylene in 1955.

7.

The search for synthetic rubber also motivated R&D projects at Bayer which eventually led to the
development of the plastic material polyurethane.

This survey shows how the BUNA S project deeply influenced the accumulation of technological innovation
capital in the German plastics industry causing thereby the high international competitiveness of this national
cluster in the period after the Second World War. But this is ex post knowledge which German chemical firms
did not possess in the early 1930s. Because of the low market price of natural rubber in this period (HOWARD,
1947, p. 8) chemical firms hesitated to built up production capacities for synthetic rubber. This technologically
producable good seemed not to be successful in economic terms. That is why the German plastics industry
owed a good deal of their early technological innovation capital to the National Socialist government whose
potential demand for synthetic rubber helped to overcome this economic uncertainty. The National Socialist
government contributed to the expenses of R&D and plant construction at Schkopau (BUNA 1) and what
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is more guaranteed to purchase a certain amount of synthetic rubber at a fixed price.3 These guarantees
reduced market risk of synthetic rubber producers considerably. Synthetic rubber plants in Huels (BUNA II)
and Ludwigshafen (BUNA III) followed. Because of government’s demand important materials of plastics
production (acetylene, acrylonitrile, butadiene, ethylene, styrene) were transferred from research laboratories
to large-scale industrial production which accelerated through “learning by doing” (ARROW, 1962) the
accumulation of technological innovation capital in the German plastics industry.
In the following sections we will turn to the economic innovation capital of the German plastics industry
by which this national cluster transformed its technological innovation capital in successful market innovations.
We will concentrate on technological cooperation within inter-industry networks.

2

The game of technological cooperation

In this section we will model technological cooperation in the German plastics industry as a simple repeated
game with two players.4 The following assumptions are stylized facts of the actual conditions in the German
plastics industry in the period after the Second World War. The players are a chemical firm representing the
few big German plastics producers and a plastics fabricator standing in for the many small and medium-sized
firms of this subindustry. We suppose that only the chemical firm tries to develop product innovations for the
plastics industry. The plastics fabricator does not carry out any R&D.5 Furthermore we assume that the
chemical firm cannot succeed in pure price competition because it is not able to produce standard plastic
materials (polyethylene, polystyrene, polyvinylchloride) as cheap as its foreign competitors.6 If the German
chemical firm has nothing to offer but the same products at higher prices the profit maximizing German
plastics fabricator will buy its inputs abroad. But the chemical firm can improve its competitiveness by
supplying not only plastic materials but also free information about innovative plastic goods. The development
of innovation capital for downstream industries causes the chemical firm a lot of expenses. If the chemical
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See “Contract about building up the synthetic rubber plant BUNA I at Schkopau from 1937", HOECHST
A RCHIVES TEA Akten 1446-1457) For the economic incentives of the National Socialist fixed price or cost plus
procurement contracts see STREB, STREB (1998).
4

For a survey of repeated game theory see for example A UMANN (1985) and PIERCE (1992).

5

See FREEMAN (1963) p. 45.
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Comparing the prices of several standard plastic materials FREEMAN (1963, p. 30) shows that the German
suppliers demanded a higher average price for plastic materials than their competitors in Great Britain and the USA in
the 1950s.
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firm is likely to gain the plastics fabricator as a customer by offering innovative knowledge in addition to
plastic materials it will nevertheless have incentives to produce this.
The chemical firm communicates information about innovations to the plastics fabricator through product
demonstrations and customer training. This technological transfer is carried out before the plastics fabricator
actually commits itself to buy plastic materials from the chemical firm. Therefore the game of technological
cooperation is played in two stages. In stage 1 the chemical firm transfers technological knowledge to the
plastics fabricator. In stage 2 the plastics fabricator decides either to take the technological transfer as a free
lunch and to continue buying its inputs from foreign suppliers at lower prices or to order plastic materials from
the chemical firm. Hence the game of technological cooperation has the following extensive form:

Chemical firm

Stage 1

TT

NTT

Plastics Fabricator
Stage 2

(0, R1 -p0 0)

NC

(-CRD, R1 -p0 0)

C

(P, R1 -p1 0)

The chemical firm moving first has the choice between the two strategies “No technological transfer (NTT)”
and “Technological transfer (TT).” The strategy “No technological transfer” means that the chemical firm
will leave the market for standard plastic materials and what is more will not communicate any further product
innovations to the plastics fabricator. Playing this strategy the payoff of the chemical firm equals zero. The
payoff of the plastics fabricator results from the simple profit function R&px, where R denotes revenues from
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selling fabricated plastic goods, p the price of plastic materials, and x the quantity of plastic materials used
by the plastics fabricator. We simplify analysis stating the following three assumptions:
1.

The fabricating costs of the plastics fabricator are neglected and set zero. We only take into account
expenses for plastic materials.

2.

The amount of plastic materials processed by the plastics fabricator is always 0 no matter which
particular plastic good is actually produced.

3.

The technological transfer increases revenues of the plastics fabricator from R0 to R1 since the
product innovations cannot be imitated by uninformed competitors of the plastics fabricator.

However, if the chemical firm plays the strategy “No technological transfer” the plastics fabricator will not
realize increasing revenues. In this case the plastics fabricator buying the necessary plastic materials from
foreign plastics producers at price p0 gets payoff R0 &p0 0. Playing ”Technological transfer” in stage 1 the
chemical firm has costs CRD which includes both expenses for R&D and costs of communicating production
innovations to the plastics fabricator. The payoff of the chemical firm depends on the reaction of the plastics
fabricator in stage 2 whose revenues increases from R0 to R1 anyway. The plastics fabricator may decide
to reward the technological transfer by playing “Cooperation” and purchasing its inputs from the chemical
firm at price p1 , p1 > p0 . But then costs of the plastics fabricator rise from p0 0 to p1 0. A first minimum
requirement for playing “Cooperation” is that the payoff of the plastics fabricator is in this case at least as
high as in the case without technological transfer.
(1)
R1 &p1 0 $ R0 &p0 0.

If the plastics fabricator cooperates the chemical firm will realize a positive payoff P. This assumption implies
that the revenues from selling plastic materials are higher than the costs of producing them in stage 2 plus the
costs of technological cooperation CRD in stage 1. 7 But the plastics fabricator cannot be forced to cooperate.
Choosing “No cooperation” the plastics fabricator gets the payoff R1 &p0 0 with
(2)
R1 &p0 0 > R1 &p1 0.
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If the chemical firm successfully cooperates with more than one plastics fabricator it can spread its fixed
costs over all buyers.
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In this instance the chemical firm not selling any plastic materials realizes a negative payoff !CRD . Backwards
induction shows that the single shot version of this game has a unique Nash equilibrium in strategies “No
technological transfer” and “No cooperation.” The chemical firm knows that after receiving the technological
transfer a profit maximizing plastics fabricator will choose to produce the product innovations using cheaper
foreign plastic materials. The promise of the plastics fabricator in stage 1 to cooperate in stage 2 is not
credible since the chemical firm has no possibility to punish the plastics fabricator for deviating from this
promise. If the game of technological cooperation is only played once a rational chemical firm will choose
strategy “No technological transfer.”
However, it is not realistic to interpret technological cooperation as a single shot game. Let us suppose that
the chemical firm has decided for some reasons 8 to built up capacities for developing product innovations for
the plastics fabricator. The building up of these particular R&D capacities needs investment in real and human
capital which means sunk costs at least in parts. Hence the chemical firm surely wants to use these capacities
for a long term producing not only one but a permanent stream of product innovations. If the chemical firm
succeeds in doing this it can punish a plastics fabricator playing “No cooperation” by excluding it from future
technological transfers. This threat will gain both credibility and power if the chemical firm plays the game
of technological cooperation not only with one but with many plastics fabricators, which is the case in reality.
In this instance the credibility of threat is higher since the chemical firm is able to afford losing one of its
customers. The power of threat increases as a plastics producer has to fear falling behind its informed
competitors after being excluded from the technological transfers.9
Technological cooperation is not a short-term single shot game but a long-term repeated game. We need
three further assumptions to describe this repeated game completely:
1.

The repeated game has an infinite time horizon. Since players cannot exactly predict at any point in
time how many periods technological cooperation will still continue they are not able to choose their
strategies through backwards induction (RUBINSTEIN, 1992).

8
9

We will discuss these reasons in great detail in section 3.

However, the plastics fabricator Freudenberg & Co, Weinheim, for instance, complained about the wide
spreading out of innovation capital by the chemical firms. If too many plastics fabricators were informed price
competition would diminish the additional revenues. To maintain its competitiveness Freudenberg was nevertheless
forced to cooperate. See FREUDENBERG-A RCHIVE 3/03233, Unterlagen zur Sitzung der Unternehmensleitung am 25.
September 1984. Standortbestimmung CEEFORM und Aufbau der CEEFASKIN-Fertigung.
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2.

Players discount their future payoffs with the help of a discount factor a, a 0 (0,1). The discount
factor is a measure for the “patience” of players. The higher a is the more players take into account
payoffs occurring in the far future when choosing their strategies in the present.

3.

A particular technological transfer from the chemical firm to the plastics fabricator increases the
revenues of the latter to R1 only for one period. If the plastics fabricator does not again receive
information about “new” product innovations its revenues will return to R0 .

Now we will check whether it is possible to implement combination “Technological transfer” and
“Cooperation” as an equilibrium of the repeated game which is Pareto superior to the single shot Nash
equilibrium “No technological transfer” and “No cooperation”.10 We suppose that the chemical firm playing
the game of technological cooperation with several plastics fabricators follows a simple trigger strategy each
time:
1.

In period 0 the chemical firm always plays strategy “Technological transfer.”

2.

In period t the chemical firm will play strategy “Technological transfer” if and only if the plastics
fabricator has played strategy “Cooperation” in all past periods 0, ..., t-1.

3.

If the plastics fabricator has chosen strategy “No cooperation” in any period t the chemical firm will
play strategy “No technological transfer” in every future period starting from period t+1. In this way
the chemical firm punishes the non-cooperative plastics fabricator through returning to the single shot
Nash equilibrium.

The chemical firm uses this trigger strategy to motivate the plastics fabricator to long-term cooperation. This
aim will only be achieved if the trigger strategy implements combination “Technological transfer” and
“Cooperation” as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the repeated game which implies that the plastics
fabricator cannot increase its discounted long-term payoff by deviating from equilibrium strategy once. Under
which economic circumstances is this condition fulfilled? Let us assume that the plastics fabricator chooses
strategy “No cooperation” in period t after playing “Cooperation” until period t-1. Because of this deviation
the plastics fabricator will be excluded from any future technological transfer from period t+1 on. Then the
plastics fabricator’s discounted long-term payoff equals
(3)

10

For the general approach see FRIEDMAN (1971).
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(1%a%...%a t&1 )[R1 &p1 x]%a t[R1 &p0 x]%(a t%1 %a t%2 ...)[R0 &p0 x]

'

1&a t
a t%1
[R1 &p1 x]%a t[R1 &p0 x]%
[R &p x]
1&a
1&a 0 0

The trigger strategy will only implement the cooperative solution as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if
this sum is not bigger than the plastics fabricator’s discounted long-term payoff when always playing
“Cooperation,”
(4)

1&a t
a t%1
1
[R1 &p1 x]%a t[R1 &p0 x]%
[R0 &p0 x]#
[R &p x]
1&a
1&a
1&a 1 1
Transforming this inequality leads to

a t%1 [R0 &p0 x&R1 %p0 x]#a t[R1 &p1 x&R1 %p0 x]

and finally to

a$

x(p1 &p0 )
R1 &R0

From a<1 follows
(5)

R1 &R0 >x(p1 &p0 )

As a result the plastics fabricator will be willing to cooperate in the long term if and only if the increase in its
revenues is higher than its additional costs when buying plastic materials from the German chemical firm.
What is more - given a certain difference of prices - the lower the discount factor a the higher the increase
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in revenues has to be to implement strategies “Technological transfer” and “Cooperation” as a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium through the trigger strategy. We have assumed that the chemical firm tries to play
the game of technological cooperation with many plastics fabricators simultaneously. Let us suppose that the
individual discount factors of these plastics fabricators a i , with i = 1 ... I, are normally distributed over the
interval (0,1). Then the number of plastics fabricators actually cooperating with the chemical firm will grow
with increasing additional revenues caused by technological transfer.
Until now we have implicitly assumed that the differences (R1 -R0 ) and (p1 -p0 ) are constant in time.
Allowing these quantities to change in time we are able to distinguish three different reasons for the ending
of a former successful technological cooperation. All other things being equal players will end technological
cooperation by turning to the single shot Nash equilibrium
1.

if the additional revenues induced by the technological transfer have become too low to compensate
the additional costs of the plastics fabricator; or

2.

if the difference of prices has increased to an amount which cannot be compensated by the increases
in revenues, or

3.

if the prices for plastic materials of the German chemical firm have become equal to or lower than
the respective prices of its international competitors.

In the first two cases the plastic fabricator will end the technological cooperation. In the third case the
chemical firm may be unwilling to continue technological transfers. However, expectations also matter.
Players who expect that one of the above cases will occur in the near future may stop playing cooperatively
at a point in time when economic conditions still seem to support further cooperation.

3

Technological cooperation in the German plastics industry

In this section we will discuss the beginning, the development, and the at least partly ending of technological
cooperation within the network of the German plastics industry from the 1930s to the 1970s. This period
covers first the National Socialist dictatorship and the post war reconstruction, second the so-called West
German economic miracle, and third the decade of oil price shocks. We will show that the terms beginning,
development and ending can be at least roughly assigned to these three subperiods. By choosing this time
frame we also want to stress that the West German economic miracle can be understood as the continuation
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of an economic development already started in the 1930s. We will especially focus on the
“Kunststoffrohstoffabteilung” (plastic materials department) of the German chemical firm BASF which was
responsible for carrying out technological transfers from BASF to plastic fabricators and machine makers.

3.1

The beginning of technological cooperation

Completing trigger strategies it is usually assumed in repeated game models that players choose cooperative
strategies in the first period 0 having by definition no own “history.” However, we cannot just assume that
automatically for chemical firms in the game of technological cooperation. A chemical firm will only take the
risky first step to set up the capacities for developing and communicating product innovations 11 if it has a prior
belief that the plastics fabricator is likely to cooperate after receiving the technological transfer. In our opinion
in the early 1950s the German chemical firms had good reasons to suppose that technological cooperation with
a downstream industry could be successfully carried out. Encouraging examples of their own history were
on the one hand the innovation of coal tar dyes in cooperation with the textile industry in the second half of
the 19th century and on the other hand the inter-industry R&D projects in the field of plastic materials within
the I.G. Farben concern. From the innovation of coal tar dyes German chemical firms learned how to organize
the institutional framework of technological cooperation. The successful inter-industry R&D projects in the
field of plastic materials increased the chemical firms’ confidence in their own innovativeness and in the
willingness of plastics fabricators to cooperate.
First of all let us view the example of coal tar dyes.12 The meteoric rise of the German chemical industry
to a position dominating the world-wide market of coal tar dyes in the second half of the 19th century is
usually explained by the excellent education of German chemists and the systematic use of industrial research
laboratories. The fact is less noticed that the German producers of coal tar dyes also owed their success to
the two new marketing strategies “customer consulting service” and “customer training” (BEER, 1959, pp.
91-94, STOKES, 1994, p. 20). The German chemical firms of the late 19th century had both technological and
economic innovation capital.

11

The set up costs of these information producing capacities are independent of the number of times the
game of technological cooperation will be played. See RADNER (1970) p. 457.
12

Quite similar to the reasons for the opening up of the technological path of plastics it was both
decreasing imports of natural dyes during the German-French War of 1870/71 and government’s demand for dyed
tunics which accelerated the innovation of coal tar dyes in Germany. See ZOHLEN, OTTO. “Geschichte der AWETA
1865-1939.” BASF-A RCHIVES Q 001.
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The so-called “Coloristische Abteilungen” (dye departments) of chemical firms established to open up new
markets for product innovations in the field of coal tar dyes were responsible for carrying out these new
marketing strategies. That is why the Coloristische Abteilungen were affiliated with the industrial research
laboratories and filled with both commercial and technical staff. Customer consulting service was done by
chemists who not only knew the special characteristics of new coal tar dyes but also had learned how to dye
and print textiles.13 Hence these chemists were able to understand the problems and the “language” of textile
producers.14 They explained in advance of sales how to use new coal tar dyes in production plants of textile
producers and also provided technical help in cases of actual processing problems after sales. About 1900
the Coloristische Abteilungen developed the idea of customer training. They taught employees of textile firms
to handle the latest techniques of dying and printing. Obviously this free one-year training was advantageous
for textile firms. The chemical firms on their part won the loyalty of future customers. What is more they only
informed the trainees about their own products thereby creating preferences. The Coloristische Abteilungen
used customer consulting service and customer training both transferring technological knowledge to gain
textile firms as long-term buyers. Half a century later German chemical firms recalled these marketing
strategies when playing the game of technological cooperation with plastics fabricators.
We have explained in section 1.2 how following the technological path of synthetic rubber led German
chemical firms to the discovery of new plastic materials like polystyrene and polyvinylchloride. However,
while synthetic rubber was demanded by the National Socialist government possible economic uses for the
new plastic materials in downstream industries and even fabricating machines hardly existed. To close this
gap the chemical firm BASF set up the “Kunststoffrohstoffabteilung” (KURO) as a new department of the
well-tried Coloristische Abteilung in 1938. 15 But at this time economic circumstances have dramatically
changed in comparison with those of the coal tar dyes boom before the First World War. Because of National
Socialist autarky policy and the likely war markets for new plastic materials had to be primarily found within
Germany. What is more the most important German chemical firms had formed I.G. Farben in the
meantime,16 so KURO had to open up new markets not only for BASF but for all I.G. Farben firms.
13

See ZOHLEN, OTTO. “Geschichte der AWETA 1865-1939.” BASF-A RCHIVES Q 001.
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To improve communication between chemists selling coal tar dyes and customers Coloristische
Abteilungen also often employed native speakers abroad.
15
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See KUCKERTZ, HEINRICH. “Geschichte der AWETA 1896-1961.” BASF-A RCHIVE Q 001.

I.G. Farbenindustrie AG founded in 1925 comprised Bayerwerke Leverkusen, BASF Ludwigshafen,
AGFA Berlin (Dreibund 1904), Farbenwerke Hoechst Frankfurt/Main, Cassela Farbwerke Mainkur Frankfurt/Main,
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However, after I.G. Farben had been broken up by the Allies KURO and most of its staff who had built up
personal relationships with plastics fabricators remained in BASF. The accumulated innovation capital of
KURO gave BASF a head start on its new German competitors in postwar Germany. Focusing on KURO
of BASF in this paper we can continually view the development of technological cooperation in the German
plastic industry from the 1930s to the period of German economic miracle.
Let us look at the period from 1938 to 1945. I.G. Farben not only included chemical firms but also machine
makers like Eckert & Ziegler and plastics fabricators like Deutsche Celluloidfabrik Eilenburg, Rheinische
Gummi- und Celluloidwerke Mannheim and Dynamit Nobel AG Troisdorf standing out due to its high
innovativeness in this period (TER MEER, 1953. p. 97). This vertical integration created optimal conditions for
the activities of KURO (DEBELL, GOGGIN, GLOOR, 1946, p. 317). KURO was able to develop plastics
fabricating machines together with I.G. Farben machine makers and what is more to cause I.G. Farben
plastics fabricators to test both new plastics fabricating machines and new plastic materials of I.G. Farben
chemical firms. Within I.G. Farben there was no danger that the giver of some technological information was
cheated by the recipient out of its economic service in return.
The two following examples are meant to represent product innovations developed by KURO in the period
before 1945 (BASF, 1989, pp. 19, 24). Problems of Dynamit Nobel AG trying to fabricate new makes of
polystyrene inspired KURO member H. Beck to invent the screw in-line injection moulding machine (patent
1943). This fabricating machine heats plastic materials more regularly and more precisely than conventional
injection moulding machines17 which allows the production of bigger plastic goods.18 The screw in-line
injection moulding machine was ready for market in the late 1950s and became an important export good of
the German machine makers. So this product innovation as well represents the long-term technological
progress in the German plastics industry overlapping political breaks. KURO also found a way to process the
new plastic material isobutylene to plastic foils suitable for making buildings watertight thereby establishing
a tradition. Product innovations for the construction industry turned into a special strength of the German
plastics industry in the post war period.

Kalle & Co AG Wiesbaden Biebrich (Dreiverband 1904/06), Chemische Fabriken Uerdingen and Chemische Fabrik
Griesheim. See STOKES (1988) pp. 11-13.
17

The first injection moulding machine usable for large-scale production was innovated by Eckert &
Ziegler in 1926.
18

See GAETH, RUDOLF . “Entwicklungsgeschichte AWETA II im Jahre 1960.” BASF-A RCHIVE Q 001 (002).
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We do not hesitate to conclude that chemical firms recalling successful technological cooperation within
I.G. Farben were more likely to dare to communicate technological knowledge to current independent plastics
fabricators in the immediate post war period. Positive past experiences created trust in the future willingness
of plastics fabricators to cooperate. Nevertheless, the example of I.G. Farben also taught German chemical
firms that vertical integration could be a less risky alternative to playing the game of technological cooperation
with independent firms. Vertical integration may improve the flow of information between chemical firm and
plastics fabricator (ARROW, 1975) and what is more may induce a more efficient R&D investment level of
the chemical firm (GROSSMANN, HART , 1986). However, we suspect that the limits of vertical integration
could be defined by the existing economic innovation capital of the integrating firm. If the chemical firm lacks
the links and marketing strategies to deal with the customers of plastics fabricators at secondary markets it
may be appropriate not to integrate. What is more vertical integration does not help to overcome the
disadvantages of the chemical firm in pure price competition since the integrated firm will also increase its
profit by buying plastic materials from cheaper foreign suppliers instead of producing them itself.

3.2

The development of technological cooperation

After defeating Germany in the Second World War the Allies firstly intended to prevent any future aggression
of Germany through destroying all plants usable for producing military equipment. Point 3 of the “Plan for
Reparations and Level of Post War German Economy” 19 from March 28th 1946 explicitly says: “In order
to eliminate Germany’s war potential, the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war, as
well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships, is prohibited and will be prevented.” What is more
point 4 of this plan determined among other things that plants needed to produce synthetic rubber had also to
be dismantled. The Allied Control Council actually forbad the production of synthetic rubber as well as
butadiene and limited the capacities of styrene and chlorine, a raw material of polyvinylchloride, by Law
Number 24 from March 3, 1950, and its predecessors (KOLLEK , 1951).
Trying to save their real and human capital accumulated in the field of synthetic rubber German chemical
firms looked for “peaceful” ways to use it.20 Because of the close technological relationship of synthetic
rubber and plastic materials the obvious thing to do was to search for these alternatives in the latter field. The
chemical products styrene and acetylene are necessary inputs for the production of the synthetic rubber
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Printed in RATCHFORD, ROSS (1947) pp. 225-230.

20

See BASF-A RCHIVE F9/15, Long-term [Production] Plan June 15, 1949.
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BUNA S. But styrene can as well be processed to the plastic material polystyrene; acetylene combines with
hydrochloric acid to form vinylchloride which can be polymerized to the plastic material polyvinylchloride.
Using their styrene and acetylene plants for production of plastic materials German chemical firms could
protect them from dismantling. That which was lacking was a sufficient number of plastics fabricators
demanding these products. That is why the chemical firms started supporting the building up of the German
plastics fabricating industry. 21
Let us again focus on the activities of KURO. After the breaking up of I.G. Farben KURO could not any
longer cooperate with dependent downstream firms within the well-ordered organization of a concern.
Henceforth KURO has had to play the game of technological cooperation with independent firms which had
always the possibility to act in a non-cooperative way. 22 Therefore KURO had not only to open up markets
for new plastic materials but also to gain plastics fabricators as long-term customers of BASF. First of all
KURO members reestablished their contacts with already existing or potential plastics fabricators known
from the I.G. Farben era. KURO granted those plastics fabricators initial aids by supplying free plastic
materials and technological advices both by presenting new fabricating methods and by providing technical
staff in cases of urgent processing problems. In the 1960s KURO refined its customer consulting service.
Exploring downstream markets for plastic goods KURO started developing so-called “finished solutions”, i.e.
complete strategies for plastics fabricators including information about how to produce an innovative plastic

21

In the late 1940s, for instance, KURO encouraged some small plastics fabricators to erect machines for
processing the quite unknown plastic material polyethylene. See SCHMITT, BERNHARD. “Die Geschichte der KURO
bis zum Jahre 1958.” BASF-A RCHIVE Q 001 (002). Polyethylene became especially useful for the packaging industry
then.
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If the chemical firm took out a patent on a particular plastics fabricating process there could also be
another way to promote the sales of the own products. In this case the chemical firm has the possibility to let the
plastics fabricator choose between not paying a license fee when using plastic materials of this supplier or paying a
license fee when processing products from competitors. That is what, for instance, BAYER did. See FREUDENBERGA RCHIVE 3/03145, Vulkollan-Vertrag zwischen Farbenfabriken Bayer AG, Leverkusen, und Carl Freudenberg K.G.
a.A., Weinheim, vom 22. September 1953; FREUDENBERG-A RCHIVE 3/04802, Frelen-Lizenzvertrag zwischen BAYER AG
Leverkusen-Bayerwerk und Firma Carl Freudenberg, Weinheim, 16. u. 23.7.1973.
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good and where to sell it.23 In addition KURO offered to optimize its customers’ expensive moulds for free.24
New plastic goods of long-term customers were tested no matter if the used plastic materials were bought
from BASF or from other suppliers.25 KURO also deployed the well-known customer training. Courses
informing about new plastics fabricating methods were given. What is more KURO trained plastics engineers
in a two-year program who were supposed to be exclusively employed by important customers of BASF
(BASF, 1989, p. 52).
Members of the KURO staff pointed out that customer consulting service and customer training had
considerably increased the loyalty of plastics fabricators to BASF in the post war period. They concluded that
for this reason domestic and foreign competitors had not succeed in entering the market of BASF despite
lower prices (KOLLEK , STANGE, 1985, pp. 284-285). In the 1960s, for example, BASF was able to sell the
plastic material styrene acrylonitrile at a price being 5 % higher than the world market price.26 However, the
repeated game model of technological cooperation has shown that chemical firms can only maintain their
customers’ loyalty by permanently transferring technological knowledge which raises the revenues of plastics
fabricators. Viewing the economic development in the 1970s will lead us to a similar result. So the marketing
strategies customer consulting service and customer training will generate loyalty if and only if they
communicate economically usable information which plastics fabricators cannot get as cheap in any other
way. Actually KURO developed several very successful product innovations in the period of the West
German economic miracle.
First of all we have to name the screw in-line injection moulding machine already mentioned above which
was made ready for market by KURO in technological cooperation with machine maker Ankerwerke
Nuremberg. This innovation helped the German plastics fabricators to get competitive advantages in world
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In a first step, for instance, KURO developed a plastic good for the furniture industry. When a furniture
fabricator was made interested in this invention, KURO introduced him to a plastics fabricator who was able to carry
out production and what is more usually bought its plastic materials from BASF. See BASF-A RCHIVE Q 002/4 19671971, Taetigkeitsbericht der AWETA K fuer das Arbeitsjahr 1971, Fachreferat Markterschliessung Maschinenbau, p.
91.
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See BASF-A RCHIVE Q 002/2 1962-1964. Taetigkeitsbericht 1964, AWETA II, Gruppe 4 Fachreferat
Verarbeitungstechnik, p. 114.
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See BASF-A RCHIVE Q 002/2 1962-1964, Forschungs- und Entwicklungsarbeiten 1. Halbjahr 1964,
AWETA II, pp. 46-48. KURO also checked new plastics fabricating machines for the machine makers. See BASFA RCHIVE Q 002/3 1965-1966, Taetigkeitsbericht 1965 AWETA II, 5. Fachreferat Schaumpolystyrole, p. 44.
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See BASF-A RCHIVE T 06, Informationsbriefe des Verkaufs Nr. 14. See also BASF-A RCHIVE F 9/159,
Verkauf an Zentralbuero 6. Mai 1958, Preistellung fuer Monostyrol und Polystyrol.
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markets since they had been informed about its usefulness by KURO early and in great detail. A second
example for the innovativeness of KURO comes from the field of constructing. In the post war period the
German construction industry had the highest consumption of plastic goods in this sector in the world for
example leading in using plastic pipes for water supply (FREEMAN, 1963, p. 47). Hence it may not be
surprising that input-output analysis for the first time carried out in West Germany for the year 1965 reveals
that construction industry was the most important industrial customer of German plastics fabricators. In 1965
they sold 28.7 % of all plastic goods which were used as inputs in downstream industries to construction
industry, 18.7 % to the machine makers, and 11.9 % to the electrical engineering industry (STATISTISCHES
BUNDESAMT, 1972, pp. 60-71). Foamed polystyrene (“Styropor”) innovated by KURO members Stastny and
Gaeth in the early 1950s was also used as an insulating material in the construction industry (HOELSCHER,
1972, p. 49). This product innovation meant that BASF could carry on making profits out of its styrene plants
formerly used for the production of BUNA S. The same argument holds for new makes of robust polystyrene
for which KURO found uses in the construction of household and electrical appliances and in the car industry.
We have already mentioned briefly that it was the search for substitutes in a country being short of raw
materials which gave the technological path chosen by German chemical industry its direction in the first half
of the 20th century. This was still true in the period after the Second World War when shortage of raw
materials more increased by the “dollar gap” of West Germany at least partly caused the fast growth of
German plastics industry. Product innovations becoming successful export goods in a longer term were often
“children of need” in the short term. It was for example not particular innovativeness but lack of alternatives
which forced German construction industry to use plastic pipes instead of copper pipes, Styropor instead of
cork. 27

3.3

The ending of technological cooperation

In the 1970s KURO had to notice that plastics fabricators more and more often chose to switch to the
strategy “No cooperation” in the repeated game of technological cooperation. Plastics fabricators kept trying
to receive new technological information from KURO, but they refused the economic service in return buying
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Chipboards produced from wood scraps and urea-formaldehyde resins which were also innovated in the
early 1950s helped the German furniture industry and machine makers specialised in chipboard fabricating machines
to get a strong position in world market. See BASF-A RCHIVE T 06, Informationsbriefe des Verkaufs Nr. 4, p. 18.
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plastic materials from suppliers with lower prices.28 BASF reacted against this behavior as assumed for the
trigger strategy in the repeated game model in section 2. Non-cooperative plastics fabricators were punished
by being excluded from any future technological transfer. What is more KURO started selling new
technological information instead of giving them away for free like before.29 Establishing the plastics
fabricator Delta Plastics BASF finally recalled vertical integration as an alternative to playing the game of
technological cooperation with independent firms (BASF, 1989, pp. 93-96, KOLLEK , STANGE, 1985, pp. 297300).
In the remaining part of this paper we will try to answer the question why in the 1970s many German
plastics fabricators decided to end technological cooperation with German chemical firms after profiting from
this inter-industry network for two decades. We know from analyzing the repeated game model in section
2 that plastics fabricators will be more likely to play a non-cooperative strategy first if the additional revenues
caused by technological transfers decrease, or second if the additional costs resulting from not buying plastic
materials from the supplier with the lowest prices increase. We will begin with having a closer look at the
technological transfers.
Until now we have discussed technological transfers in the German plastics industry by naming product
innovations developed by KURO. In a more macroeconomic approach we will now turn our attention to longterm growth of total factor productivity in the plastics fabricating industry as a whole. In a multiperiod
examination total factor productivity measures which share of an increase in output of an industry cannot be
explained by the quantitative increase in inputs with remaining qualities. Total factor productivity will
particularly grow if an industry is able to produce due to technological progress either a certain good with less
inputs or with the same amount of inputs a higher preferred good than in the period before. The first case
rather refers to process innovations, the second one rather to product innovations. Technological progress
usually does not fall like manna from heaven but results from R&D efforts. We have seen it was the big
chemical firms and not the small or medium-sized plastics fabricators which did most of R&D in the German
plastics industry in the post war period. Technological transfers from chemical firms to plastics fabricators
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After successfully developing a polyethylene bottle for milk in technological cooperation with KURO,
plastics fabricators, for instance, changed to cheaper suppliers of this plastic material. See BASF-A RCHIVE Q 002/4
1967-1971, Taetigkeitsbericht der AWETA II fuer das Arbeitsjahr 1969, Fachreferat Marktentwicklung Verpackung, p.
90.
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See BASF-A RCHIVE Q 002/5 1972-, Taetigkeitsbericht der AWETA KT 1974, Fachreferat Maschinenbau
und Elektrotechnik, p. 60.
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were then carried out either by communication or by delivering improved inputs. Sometimes both channels
acted in combination. This again shows the example of the screw in-line injection moulding machine. In a first
step KURO informed machine makers and plastics fabricators about how to produce and how to use this
innovation. In a second step plastics fabricators substituted in-line screw injection moulding machines for their
obsolete fabricating machines by buying them from machine makers.
Hence there are grounds for believing that the development of total factor productivity of German plastics
fabricators was mostly determined by R&D successes and failures of upstream chemical firms. Under this
assumption total factor productivity of the plastics fabricating industry can be used to answer the question at
least roughly whether or not technological cooperation in this inter-industry network resulted in considerable
increases in revenues of plastics fabricators. We have calculated total factor productivity on basis of a CobbDouglas production function which is homogeneous of degree 1 in the inputs labor and capital. 30

(6)
Pt'Ot&aLt&(1&a)(U t%Ct)
Variables marked by the subscript t denote growth rates in year t. P stands for total factor productivity, O
for gross real value added, L for total amount of hours worked, C for capital stock, U for capacity utilization,
and a for wage share of factor incomes. Figure 1 in the appendix shows the annual growth rates of total
factor productivity both for the German plastics fabricating industry and for the German manufacturing
industry as a whole in the period from 1950 to 1980. We want to stress three results:
1.

Except for the years 1963, 1975 and 1979 the annual growth rates of total factor productivity of
plastics fabricators were always higher than those of manufacturing industry. This might indicate an
above-average technological progress in plastics fabricating industry.

2.

However, annual growth rates converged in time. In the first decade the average annual growth rate
of total factor productivity of plastics fabricators amounted to over 350 % of the one of
manufacturing industry. In the following this number was declining to 230 % in the second decade
and to mere 160 % in the last decade.
30

For calculation method see SOLOW (1957) and NELSON (1964). For data see KRENGEL et al (1973 and 1975)
and GOERZIG et al (1986).
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3.

What is more the average annual growth rate of total factor productivity of plastics fabricators was
also decreasing in its value from 5 % (1951-1960) via 2.1 % (1961-1970) to 1.3 % (1971-1980).
German plastics fabricators were not able to repeat the considerable increases in productivity of the
first two decades in the 1970s.

It seems highly likely that these results mean that the stream of product innovations communicated from the
chemical firms to the plastics fabricators became much thinner in the 1970s.31 This result may not be
surprising since many important markets for plastic goods (packaging and containers, building materials,
electronic equipment, household goods, toys) had been already developed thirty years after the discovery of
standard plastic materials. There is also the fact that consumers started rejecting plastic goods in new uses
and what is more preferring “natural” goods in apparent established markets of plastic goods due to both an
increase in per capita income and an awakening care for environmental problems in the 1970s.32
Figure 2 in the appendix shows the development of growth rates of total factor productivity in the German
and the US-American plastics fabricating industries for the period from 1951 to 1976. The US-American data
are taken from K ENDRICK and GROSSMAN (1980, p.151). Two reasons prevent direct comparison of German
and US-American numbers. First K ENDRICK and GROSSMAN used a slightly different method for calculating
total factor productivity. 33 Second underlying Major Group 30 of Standard Industrial Classification includes
not only plastics fabricators but also rubber fabricators. Nevertheless, we should at least be able to identify
the main differences between the two industries. The fact stands out that the annual growth rates of total
factor productivity of US-American plastics fabricators had negative values in the majority in the 1950s while
the German numbers of this period were exceptionally high. We understand these comparatively higher
growth rates of total factor productivity in the German plastics fabricating industry partly as a catching-up
process partly as a developing lead in special fields like plastic goods used by construction industry.
31

An indicator for the decreasing innovativeness of the German plastics producers is also the fact that
KURO itself had to recognize in 1970 that some foreign producers of polystyrene were already superior in
Schumpeterian competition. See BASF-A RCHIVE Q 002/4 1967-1971, Taetigkeitsbericht der AWETA K fuer das
Arbeitsjahr 1970, Fachreferat Styrolpolymerisate, p. 9.
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In the early 1970s, for example, KURO had to deal with customers who suddenly rejected
polyvinylchloride because of news about its possible toxicity. See BASF-A RCHIVE Q 002/5 1972-, Taetigkeitsbericht
der AWETA KT,Fachreferat Polyvinylchloride, p. 27.
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KENDRICK and GROSSMAN used among other things a weighted arithmetic average of labor and capital to
avoid the implications of a Cobb-Douglas production function (linear homogeneity with unit elasticity of
substitution). For a discussion of their calculating method see KENDRICK (1973) pp. 11-15.
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During the 1960s and the early 1970s the average annual growth rates of total factor productivity of the
German and the US-American plastics fabricating industries were almost equal. This observation seems to
indicate that in this period technological cooperation with the German chemical firms did not any longer help
German plastics fabricators to get competitive advantages over their US-American competitors. This
assumption is also supported by the fact that US-American chemical firms themselves started cooperating
with plastics fabricators by building up departments similar to KURO in the early 1960s.34 A speech of David
H. Dawson of Du Pont from May 2nd 1961 excellently illustrates that: “Nowadays, with more complex
products and heightened product competition, the need for technical aid has grown greatly. The
customer will give his business to the producer who helps him solve his problems and enhance his
earnings. That this is proceeding to great length is evident from the magnitude and rapid growth of
our new Chestnut Run end-use and technical service establishment near Wilmington ... Much of the
work in these laboratories is directed toward the cultivation of markets once or twice removed from
our own ... In plastics, especially the newer types, it is often necessary to work out design of a plastic
component for use in an automobile or a washing machine and only then go to work with our
immediate customer, the supplier of molded or extruded parts, on methods of producing the parts.”35
Successful marketing strategies can also be imitated. 36
Let us summarize. The economic incentives for German plastics fabricators to choose a cooperative
strategy in the repeated game of technological cooperation considerably declined in the 1970s. The threat of
German chemical firms to exclude a plastics fabricator from future technological transfers lost a good deal
of its terror since product innovations developed by German chemical firms obviously became rarer and less
often led to additional revenues of plastics fabricators in a amount known from the past. What is more foreign
chemical firms also provided new technological information for plastics fabricators now.
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In 1960 Du Pont opened a sales department in Geneva which was responsible for the technological
consulting of the European customers. See BASF-A RCHIVE Q 006 Ordner 1, Anwendungstechnische Mitteilungen
aus Werk und Praxis Band III, AWETA II, KURO-LARO-SPEZIAL, Jahrgang 1960, Dezember-Heft. The Goodrich
Chemical Comp. established a similar department in the Hague the same year. See FREUDENBERG-A RCHIVE 3/01250,
Bericht ueber den Besuch bei der Firma B.F. Goodrich Chemical Comp., Cleveland am 28.3.1960.
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Cited after BACKMAN (1965) p.44.

It was in the late 1960s when the customer consultants of KURO actually noted that competition had
increased because of other suppliers imitating their marketing strategies. See BASF-A RCHIVE Q 002/4 1967-1971,
Taetigkeitsbericht der AWETA II fuer das Arbeitsjahr 1967, 7. Fachreferat Technischer Kundendienst Extrudieren, p.
29.
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Let us finally view the development of prices for plastic materials. The price competition in the field of
standard plastic materials increased in the 1970s since more and more new suppliers entered world market
such that overcapacities inevitably occurred. 37 The group of new suppliers included among others Japan and
the oil producing countries at the level of national economies and the petroleum raffinating industry integrating
forwards into plastics producing and plastics fabricating at the level of firms. Plastics producers in Belgium,
Italy and the Netherlands especially became competitors of German chemical firms. An important thing here
is that firms in Italy and the Netherlands profited from a particular locational factor. Large deposits of natural
gas which can be used as a cheap raw material for production of plastic materials were discovered in both
countries in the late 1950s (AFTALION, 1991). During and after the collapse of the Bretton Woods regime
of fixed exchange rates the German Mark was considerably revaluated, for example with regard to the USDollar by 120 % between 1968 and 1980 (DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, 1995, p. 10). This development brought
both advantages and disadvantages for the German chemical industry. On the one hand the repeated
revaluations of German Mark enabled German plastics producers to buy necessary inputs produced from oil
and usually priced at US-Dollars at comparatively lower prices than their foreign competitors. On the other
hand it became more difficult for the German chemical industry to export plastic materials and easier for
foreign suppliers to undercut its prices in Germany. How were the prices of plastic materials actually
developing against this economic background?
A detailed comparison of international prices for the standard plastic materials polyvinylchloride,
polystyrene, and polyethylene is hardly possible on basis of available data.38 What is more German chemical
firms affirm that a unique price for a certain plastic material does not even exist at the level of the firm itself
since prices were differently set dependent on the particular customer and the amount of plastic materials
ordered. 39 Nevertheless let us look at the published data about the development of German producer prices
and wholesale prices in Italy and the USA converted in German Mark per kilogram for the plastic materials
polyvinylchloride (figure 3) and polyethylene 40 (figure 4) for the period from 1968 to 1980. It turns out that
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See BASF-A RCHIVE Q 002/5 1972-, Taetigkeitsbericht der AWETA KT 1972, Fachreferat
Polyvinylchloride, p. 20.
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Statistical surveys of the international chemical industry edited by OECD did for example not include any
data about prices of plastic materials in the 1970s.
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See for example BASF-A RCHIVE F 9/159, Preise der Lupolen-Marken vom 25.8.1958.

In 1968 BASF noted 50 polyethylene producing competitors on the whole, among them 13 US-American
and 7 Italian firms. See BASF-A RCHIVE Q 006 Ordner V, Anwendungstechnische Mitteilungen aus Werk und Praxis
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German price competitiveness regarding both polyvinylchloride and polyethylene considerably got worse
compared with the wholesale prices in the USA, especially in the time before the first oil price shock in 1974.
We get a different result in regard to Italy. German and Italian prices for polyvinylchloride were almost
developing parallel with slight advantages for Italy. In contrast to this prices for polyethylene were clearly
changing to the disadvantage of Italy. Further price comparisons for polystyrene and with respect to Belgium
or the Netherlands would be desirable but are not possible on basis of current available data. However, the
international development of the indices of Revealed Comparative Advantage regarding the national plastics
producers between 1970/72 and 1981/83 confirms the observations of figures 3 and 4 and seems to close
some further gaps of our knowledge. Belgium and the Netherlands considerably improved their
competitiveness in the world plastic material market in the 1970s, the United States held its position, Germany
and Italy fell behind (UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION, 1986, p. 206).
The following conclusion may be drawn from the analysis of section 3.3. Playing strategy “Cooperation”
in the repeated game of technological cooperation lost its attraction for German plastic fabricators in the 1970s
since product innovations developed by German chemical firms did not any longer increase their productivity
and revenues in the same amount as in the two decades before while differences between prices of German
and foreign standard plastic materials did at best not considerably change in favor of the German suppliers.
These observations explain why KURO had to notice in the 1970s that plastic fabricators more and more
often behaved non-cooperative. There may be a third reason. German plastics fabricators themselves faced
an intensifying competition for the rather stagnating demand for plastic goods. It is conceivable that this
increased competition caused plastic fabricators to become more “impatient” and to strive for maximizing
short-term profits primarily, i.e. their discount factors were not constant but decreased. All other things being
equal decreasing discount factors themselves would increase the number of plastics fabricators playing “No
cooperation” in the 1970s.
All that does not imply that German chemical firms completely stopped playing the game of technological
cooperation in the fields of plastics in the 1970s. But they turned their attention to more advanced plastic

Band III, AWETA II und Schaumstoff-Abteilung, Jahrgang 1968, Maerz-Heft.
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materials and to new partners.41 This again illustrates KURO which successfully developed the plastic gas
tank for the car industry. 42

4

Conclusion

Starting point of section 1 was the hypothesis that a national industry needs both technological and economic
innovation capital to succeed in Schumpeterian competition in world markets for a long term. Technological
innovation capital is built up by early entering a new technological path often motivated by potential demand
of governments. It enables a national industry to invent products on the respective frontier of knowledge.
Economic innovation capital means the capability to transform technologically producable goods in successful
product innovations. A national industry can improve this capability by forming networks with downstream
or upstream industries. Technological transfers within these inter-industry networks can lead to clusters of
different national industries all being highly competitive in international markets. Such a cluster was the
German plastics industry in the decades after the Second World War including machine makers specialized
in plastics fabricating machines, chemical firms producing plastic materials, and plastics fabricators. In the
following we focused on technological transfers within the network of the German plastics industry.
In section 2 we developed a repeated game model of technological cooperation in order to explain under
which economic circumstances plastics fabricators will buy plastic materials from a supplier offering its
products at higher prices than its competitors. It turned out that a chemical firm can gain plastics fabricators
as long-term customers despite its higher prices if it also supplies technological information which lead to
additional revenues of plastics fabricators being higher than their additional costs.
In section 3 we viewed the historical development of technological cooperation in the German plastics
industry from

the

1930s

to

the

1970s.

We

especially

concentrated

on

the

so-called

“Kunststoffrohstoffabteilung” (KURO), a special department of the chemical firm BASF, which was
established to carry out technological transfers from BASF to other industries. The opening up of the new
technological path of plastics was a byproduct of producing the synthetic rubber BUNA S by I.G. Farben.
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The idea to concentrate on advanced plastic materials was already expressed by KURO in 1968. See
BASF-A RCHIVE Q 002/4 1967-1971, Taetigkeitsbericht 1968 AWETA II, Fachreferat Polyvinylchloride.
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Daimler-Benz, Porsche and VW received the technological information about this invention for free in
the early 1970s. However, KURO and BMW agreed in 1974 that the latter would carry some part of the costs of
developing the plastic gas tank for its cars. See BASF-A RCHIVE Q 002/5 1972-, Taetigkeitsbericht der AWETA KT
1974, Marktentwicklung Maschinenbau und Elektrotechnik, p. 63. See also BASF-A RCHIVE Q 002/4 1967-1971.
Taetigkeitsbericht der AWETA II fuer das Arbeitsjahr 1967, Technikum fuer Kunststoffverarbeitung, p. 73.
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After the Second World War German chemical firms supported the building up of the German plastics
fabricating industry with the help of the marketing strategies customer consulting service and customer
training which had been learned and for the first time successfully deployed during the coal tar dyes boom.
Technological cooperation in the decades of the German economic miracle resulting in famous product
innovations like the screw in-line injection moulding machine or foamed polystyrene drove the German plastics
industry to a leading position in world markets. However, in the 1970s many German plastics fabricators
switched to play a non-cooperative strategy in the repeated game of technological cooperation when starting
buying their inputs from foreign suppliers at lower prices. Then we calculated growth rates of total factor
productivity in the German plastics fabricating industry for the period from 1950 to 1980. It turned out that
increases in productivity of German plastics fabricators in the 1970s were neither as high as in the two
decades before nor higher than those of their US-American competitors. This result seems to prove that in
the 1970s product innovations developed by German chemical firms did not increase revenues of plastics
fabricators as often as in the past. What is more foreign chemical firms had also started offering new
technological information in the meantime. All that considerably decreased incentives for German plastics
fabricators to cooperate with German chemical firms.
The concepts of inter-industry technological cooperation in particular and non-imitable innovation capital
in general can help to explain why certain national industries are dominating international markets for a long
time. We can also learn from this concepts what national industries should do and should avoid if they want
to win international Schumpeterian competition.
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Archives

BASF Unternehmensarchiv (BASF-A RCHIVE), Ludwigshafen, Germany.

Freudenberg Firmen- und Familienarchiv (FREUDENBERG-A RCHIVE), Weinheim, Germany.

HOECHST A RCHIVES , Frankfurt/Main, Germany.
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Appendix

Table 1

Domestic and Foreign Prices for Plastic Materials 1

Year

Polyvinylchloride

Polyethylene

German

US-

Italian

German

US-

Italian

Producer

American

Wholesale

Producer

American

Wholesale

Prices

Wholesale

Prices

Prices

Wholesale

Prices

Prices

Prices

1968=100

1968=100

1968=100

1968=100

1968=100

1968=100

1968

100

100

100

100

100

100

1969

104.5

97.7

104.3

96.5

96.4

100

1970

105.5

91.0

101.7

94.3

89.8

100

1971

103.8

83.5

97.4

91.8

70.1

100

1972

102.4

63.2

95.5

86.6

53.3

103.7

1973

108.0

54.1

93.1

85.9

50.3

111.1

1974

148.7

91.0

147.4

116.4

74.9

148.1

1975

141.6

106.0

131.0

112.5

90.4

146.3

1976

146.6

103.0

143.1

116.7

101.8

169.4

1977

144.6

102.3

131.9

110.5

95.2

147.2

1978

132.0

90.2

117.2

106.2

80.2

129.6

1979

157.2

94.0

148.3

128.9

79.6

184.3

1980

160.6

107.5

151.7

142.6

103.6

217.6

1 STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT , editor. “Preise und Preisindizes fuer industrielle Produkte, Index der Erzeugerpreise.”
Fachserie M Preise, Loehne, Wirtschaftsrechnung Reihe 3, Wiesbaden. STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT , editor. “Preise
und Preisindizes im Ausland.” Statistik des Auslands Reihe 5, Wiesbaden. The US-American and Italian prices are
converted in German Mark per kilogram on basis of the average exchange rate of the respective year. For the
exchange rates see DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, editor, 1995. “Devisenkursstatistik Februar 1995.” Statistisches Beiheft
zum Monatsbericht 5. Frankfurt/Main. Notice that a US-American pound equals 0.4536 kilogram.
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Table 2
Year

Annual Growth Rates of Total Factor Productivity, in percentage
Annual Growth Rate of Total Factor
Productivity in percent 1
German
Plastics
Fabricators 2

German
Manufacturin
g Industry 3

Year

US Plastics
Fabricators 4

Annual Growth Rate of Total Factor
Productivity in percent 1
German
Plastics
Fabricators 2

German
Manufacturin
g Industry 3

US Plastics
Fabricators 4

1951

14.1

3.4

15.1

1966

1.2

-0.1

0.9

1952

2.6

0.9

-2.8

1967

2.9

0.8

0.3

1953

5.2

0.8

-4.9

1968

3.2

1.3

4.2

1954

2.6

2.3

-3.6

1969

3.2

1.9

5.1

1955

4.8

2.4

-0.7

1970

0.3

0.1

-8.2

1956

2.0

0.6

-1.3

1971

2.7

0.2

6.8

1957

7.8

1.4

-2.4

1972

3.7

1.3

3.5

1958

4.6

0.4

3.8

1973

3.5

1.5

4.3

1959

8.4

2.1

13.5

1974

1.2

0.2

-9.3

1960

6.7

2.5

0.2

1975

0.1

0.4

-1.8

1961

3.5

0.8

4.3

1976

3.4

2.0

7.4

1962

6.0

0.9

6.0

1977

2.4

0.9

1963

0.6

0.9

7.4

1978

1.6

0.5

1964

6.1

2.0

2.6

1979

0.6

1.5

1965

2.1

0.6

0.3

1980

0.4

0.0

1 The German numbers are calculated on basis of data from GOERZIG, BERND, JOACHIM SCHINTKE and PETER
BAUMANN, 1986. “Produktionsvolumen und -potential, Produktionsfaktoren des Bergbaus und des Verarbeitenden
Gewerbes in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland - begruendet von Rolf Krengel.” Statistische Kennziffern 28 1970-1985.
Berlin. KRENGEL, ROLF , EGON BAUMGART , A RTHUR BONESS, RAINER PISCHNER and KAETHE DROEGE, 1973.
“Produktionsvolumen und -potential, Produktionsfaktoren der Industrie im Gebiet der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
einschliesslich Berlin (West).” Statistische Kennziffern 13 1950-1960. Berlin. KRENGEL, ROLF , EGON BAUMGART ,
A RTHUR BONESS, RAINER PISCHNER and KAETHE DROEGE, 1975. “Produktionsvolumen und -potential, Produktionsfaktoren der Industrie im Gebiet der Bundesrepublik Deutschland einschliesslich Saarland und Berlin (West).”
Statistische Kennziffern 16 Neuberechnung 1960-1970. Berlin. The numbers for the US Plastics fabricators are from
KENDRICK, JOHN W. and ELLIOT S. GROSSMAN, 1980. “Productivity in the United States. Trends and Cycles.”
Baltimore, London, who use a slightly different calculating method.
2 The wage share of the German plastics fabricators is fixed on a = 0.408.
3 The wage share of the German manufacturing industry is fixed on a = 0.360.
4 This industry also includes the US rubber fabricators.
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Annual growth rates of total factor productivity in the German plastics
fabricating industry (GPF) and the German manufacturing industry (GMI),
1951-1980, in percentage

Figure 1
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Annual growth rates of total factor productivity in the German plastics
fabricating industry (GPF) and the US-American plastics fabricating
industry (USPF), 1951-1976, in percentage

Figure 2
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Figure 3

German domestic producer prices and wholesale prices in Italy and the USA
for polyvinylchloride, in German Mark per kilogram, 1968-1980, 1968=100
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Figure 4

German domestic producer prices and wholesale prices in Italy and the USA
for polyethylene, in German Mark per kilogram, 1968-1980, 1968=100
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